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Abstract We are living in an age of pluralization in which religiosity and secu-
larity are not mutually exclusive. With subversive intent, Peter L. Berger relativizes
with this thesis his criticism of secularization theory. In the light of the persistence
and widespread nature of religion and religiosity, Berger still considers secular-
ization theory’s assumption that modernization and secularization go hand in hand
to be empirically untenable. At the same time, however, he acknowledges that a
‘‘secular discourse’’ has asserted itself globally and has achieved a dominant
position in society. This secular discourse also spreads throughout the mind of each
individual, without (necessarily) driving out religiosity. The present article traces
the lines of argumentation in Peter L. Berger’s works that lead to the thesis of two
pluralisms: the coexistence of different religions and the coexistence of religious
and secular discourse. Moreover, it establishes a connection between the question of
the simultaneity of religiosity and secularity and the debate on hybridity that is
currently being conducted within German-speaking sociology. The author postu-
lates that this focus on ‘‘in-between’’ spaces—that is, on plurality and hybridity—
rather than on dichotomies has the potential to trigger a new paradigm for religion in
the modern age.
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Introduction
Can people be religious and secular at the same time? Religion is ‘‘the belief that
there is a reality beyond the reality of ordinary experience, and that this reality is of
great significance for human life’’ (Berger 2014: 17). Secularity means the
questioning—or, at least, the conscious bracketing—of the existence of such a
reality. Are religiosity and secularity not, therefore, mutually exclusive? Would our
commonsense not say that God either exists or—to borrow Nietzsche’s famous
phrase—God is dead?
What poses a challenge for sociological analysis is the ‘‘both/and’’—not only
with regard to the individual but also to society per se. Is it possible to
simultaneously propound both a religious worldview and a secular worldview that
questions all things divine? Are religiously motivated terrorist attacks not shocking
evidence of the hotbeds of conflict throughout the world that arise from the
parallelism of religious and secular worldviews?
Pluralism, as defined by Peter L. Berger in his new book The Many Altars of
Modernity, is his interpretation of this complex individual and social constellation:
‘‘Pluralism is a social situation in which people with different ethnicities, worldviews,
and moralities, live together peacefully and interact with each other amicably’’ (2014:
1). Berger thus provides a situational description of pluralism that, despite his
assertions to the contrary, has undertones of an attitude that celebrates the pluralist
reality and could therefore be an element of a political program.1
Berger’s question regarding the simultaneity of religiosity and secularity ties in
with the current debate within German-language sociology about social hybridity
and hybrid sociality (see Kron 2015), although he does not use these terms himself.
The fundamental aim of this debate is to shift the sociological perspective to a
‘‘both/and’’ logic that does not replace the ‘‘either/or logic’’ but rather supplements
it with ‘‘concepts that complement and blend with each other’’ (Beck and Grande
2007: 29). Unequivocalness is not thereby declared obsolete but rather fictional—
without, however, denying its raison d’eˆtre. Giesen et al. (2015: 50) argue that,
viewed from this perspective, the hybrid becomes the ‘‘cultural normal case,’’ while
unequivocalness must be considered the exception.
This focus on an ‘‘in-between,’’ which circumvents thinking in dichotomies and
binary codes, has explosive implications for both social theory and the theory of
society. Not only with regard to religion, this perspective raises the question of
whether it must be assumed (a) that people switch between two supposedly
incompatible states, or (b) whether two supposedly distinct states merge to such an
extent that ‘‘in-between’’ states arise (Giesen et al. 2015: 49). Berger (2014: 68f.,
71f.; see also Berger et al. 1973: 37) maintains that religiously minded modern
1 Berger and Zijderveld (2009: 7) distinguished plurality (‘‘an empirically available social reality’’) and
pluralism (‘‘the attitude that welcomes the reality’’). Although they acknowledged that what they called
plurality was ‘‘more commonly known as pluralism,’’ they eschewed the term pluralism ‘‘because the
suffix ‘ism’ suggests an ideology’’. However, because Berger (2014: 1) found that when he used plurality
he constantly had to explain what he was talking about (‘‘(…) ‘you know, like pluralism’’’) he abandoned
the terminological clarification that played such an important role in Berger and Zijderveld (2009) and
now uses pluralism to describe the social reality rather than celebrate it.
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individuals are capable of sequentially engaging in secular and religious activities.
In other words, they are capable of ‘‘code switching’’ within seconds between
secular and sacred realities (as cited in Ammerman 2014: 103). With this processual
understanding, Berger assumes the existence of two worlds, of which the secular is
the ‘‘paramount reality.’’ Here, he draws on Alfred Schutz’s concept of multiple
realities (although Schutz does not refer to religion) which assumes rapid, and
sometimes abrupt, transitions between subuniverses of meaning (Schutz 1962).
Ammerman (2014: 100ff.), on the other hand, tends more towards variant (b) above.
In the ‘‘everyday stories of a wide range of Americans,’’ she identified hybrid types
of ‘‘spiritual narratives’’ (2014: 103): ‘‘Sometimes people are aware of moving back
and forth, but just as often they seem to occupy a single location that is both secular
and sacred at the same time.’’ This contradicts Berger’s assumption that the
religious and the secular constitute distinct spheres. And, finally, Hannah Arendt
(1998) sketches an ‘‘in-between’’ world in which plurality—the condition of the
human condition—takes hold.
Pluralism in the Mind
Critical of the perspective adopted by Taylor (2007), Berger (2014) characterizes
modernity not as a secular but rather as a pluralist age. And even though the modern
age is especially characterized by pluralism, Berger (2014: 4) cites as examples of
highly developed pluralist eras (a) the several centuries during which the cultures of
East Asia along the Silk Road ‘‘demonstrated an exuberant religious pluralism,’’ and
(b) the period in the late Roman Empire during which Hellenism flourished. Hence,
pluralism is not in itself a new phenomenon. However, Berger (2014: 5) identifies
‘‘two powerful agents of modern pluralism,’’ namely, the printing press and the
steam engine—in other words, science and technology.
In a study entitled Modernity, Pluralism and the Crisis of Meaning, which was
commissioned by the Bertelsmann Foundation, Berger and Luckmann (1995) use
the metaphor of the coffee maker to illustrate the process of this change in
consciousness: The modernization of consciousness causes the taken-for-granted
interpretations that lie in the ‘‘depths’’ (at the level that Alfred Schutz called the
‘‘world-taken-for-granted’’) to evaporate upward to the ‘‘sphere of insecurity, that
which is not taken for granted, opinions, which I am in principle prepared to revise
or even retract’’ (Berger and Luckmann 1995: 44). As a result, the residual (coffee)
grounds of certain knowledge shrink.
Societies in which the modern form of pluralism is fully developed are societies in
which ‘‘value systems and stocks of meaning are no longer the common property of all
members of society’’ (Berger and Luckmann 1995: 29). From a sociology-of-
knowledge perspective, not only general knowledge shrinks in pluralist times but also
the stock of unquestioned, secure subjective knowledge. The individual no longer
unquestioningly knows ‘‘about the world, how to behave in it, what is reasonable to
expect, and, last but not least, who he is’’ (Berger and Luckmann 1995: 40).
In his latest book, Berger (2014: 28f.) develops the thesis of a ‘‘pluralism in the
mind,’’ in which a religious and a secular discourse coexist. Strictly speaking, this
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pluralism in the mind is composed of two pluralisms—the diversity of religious
offerings, on the one hand, and the diversity of narratives that shape the secular
discourse, on the other. Religiously minded individuals find themselves confronted
with a complex and disparate situation: At the level of society, this situation
corresponds to an institutional structure that is as differentiated as it is eroding. This
complicates the question of how this coexistence can and must be perceived—as
competition or conflict, as a switch, or as a synthesis?
When seeking an answer to this question, it is helpful to recall that a worldview,
or, indeed the human mind, is not a coherent whole but rather an incoherent
hodgepodge of movable pieces onto which order can be imposed only analytically:
• As in the case of the coffee-maker metaphor (Berger and Luckmann 1995: 44),
Berger (2014: 29) locates the unquestioned certainties, the world-taken-for-
granted, on the lowest level of this layer model. In her response to Berger,
Ammerman (2014: 100) describes this level as the ‘‘inner core of taken-for-
granted assumptions about the way the world works.’’
• On the middle level, Berger locates ‘‘cognitive and normative definitions of
reality that are widely accepted’’ (2014: 29). By this he means explanations,
justifications, and values ‘‘that we consensually share with our culture’’
(Ammerman 2014: 100). Because ‘‘culture’’ is not a nationally delimited vessel,
it is difficult to determine what these shared explanations, justifications, and
values actually are. Just how difficult this is, can be seen from the renewed
Leitkultur (defining culture) debate in Germany and the Wertefibel (handbook of
values) debate in Austria, which were triggered by the current migratory flows.
• Preferences and opinions that are held ‘‘until further notice’’ (Schutz) form the
top layer—although this layer can no longer be regarded as having any great
degree of certainty at all. This is the level with which we are most familiar. It
contains, for example, the opinions that we quickly form, and just as quickly
discard, while reading the newspaper, and our changing tastes, aesthetic
tendencies, and political leanings, the fickleness of which is obviously also
steadily increasing.
According to Berger, religion has now arrived in the latter sphere. Hence, faith,
which was originally an unquestionable given, has been shifted from the ‘‘strongly
institutionalized’’ background of human social life to the ‘‘de-institutionalized’’
foreground (Berger 2014: 6) and has become a matter of choice. This does not
necessarily lead to an abandonment of faith. However, religious convictions are no
longer taken for granted, but rather require a conscious decision. This is reflected in
the fact that existing options are also—and, in most of the world, especially—
religious (see Berger 2014: 31).
At this point, Berger corrects himself. For many years he held the view that fewer
and fewer people experienced their lives as being interwoven with religion.2 Now,
2 ‘‘As there is a secularization of society and culture, so is there a secularization of consciousness. Put
simply, this means that the modern West has produced an increasing number of individuals who look
upon the world and their own lives without the benefit of religious interpretations’’ (Berger 1967: 107f.).
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however, he assumes that a secular discourse is permeating the religious discourse.
This by no means results in religiosity being driven out of human consciousness.
Rather, the consequence is an increase in complexity that can be described as
‘‘social hybridity,’’ which goes hand in hand with ‘‘hybrid sociality.’’3
Societal Correlate of Pluralism in the Mind
To adequately describe ‘‘pluralism in the mind,’’ one must also focus on the
institutions that serve as guarantors of the taken-for-granted. What characterizes a
social order (i.e., an institutional structure) in which pluralism of the mind prevails?
Berger points out that ‘‘all institutions out there in society have an internal correlate
in consciousness’’ (2014: 34f.). Key to this is the process that social constructivist
theory calls institutionalization: Social actions become habits, and these habits
crystallize to form normatively and cognitively plausible programs for social action.
They are then internalized in individual consciousness, with the result that they
guide the individual in his actions and are perceived as his own subjective meaning
rather than the meaning of an other.
For the longest period of time in human history, social life was ‘‘programmed’’
by religious institutions that jointly formed a ‘‘sacred canopy’’ (Berger 1967).
Drawing on Gehlen’s anthropology, Berger (2014: 6) uses Gehlen’s distinction
between a ‘‘strongly institutionalized’’ background of human social life and a ‘‘de-
institutionalized’’ foreground to emphasize not only the limits of this ‘‘program-
ming’’ but also the way institutionalization dovetails with processes of de-
institutionalization. According to this perspective, the coercive nature of institutions
(see Rehberg 1994) does not end beyond the boundaries of the institution but rather
in the forecourt, which is accessible to doubt.
With regard to the origins of the secular discourse, Berger follows Eric Voegelin,
who, he notes, described the breakdown of the mythological view of the world ‘‘as a
move from ‘compactness’ (reality experienced as one unified whole) to ‘differen-
tiation’ (opening up a gap between transcendence and immanence)’’ (2014: 51).
According to Karl Jaspers (as cited in Berger 2014: 51), the breakdown of the
compact cosmos occurred during the ‘‘‘axial age’ (somewhere between the eighth
and fifth centuries BCE).’’ In modern times, the religious institutions themselves
paved the way for secular discourse. According to Berger (2014: 59), one stepping
stone was the integration of natural law, and thus a secular perspective, into
Catholic moral theology; another was the Protestant Reformation, which marked the
beginning of the separation of church and state as a means of protecting freedom of
religion against theocratic tendencies. In the First Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, this separation advanced to the status of a political institution
(Berger 2014: 60). And this epitome of secular discourse eventually became taken-
3 See, once again, the volume edited by Kron (2015), which documents the sociological debate on
hybridity and, thus, the sociological reflection on the problem form of unity and difference. In their
introduction to the latter work, Kron and Berger (2015: 13) note in relation to ‘‘friend and enemy,’’ ‘‘war
and peace,’’ ‘‘politics and economics,’’ ‘‘communication and technology,’’ and ‘‘sense and nonsense’’ that
the one cannot exist, or be meaningful, without the other, and that this is what renders the hybrid possible.
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for-granted knowledge as it went from being not only a mainstream culture of
religious tolerance but also something that was represented in the consciousness of
each individual citizen—on the middle level of certainty, where widely shared
cultural values are located.
Over four decades ago, Berger elaborated in The Sacred Canopy (1967) the
notion that secularization must have a correlate both in culture and society and at the
level of consciousness. In Part II of that book, which he now considers to be
outdated because in it he still adhered to secularization theory, he wrote:
By secularization we mean the process by which sectors of society and culture
are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. When
we speak of society and institutions in modern Western history, of course,
secularization manifests itself in the evacuation by the Christian churches of
areas previously under their control and influence—as in the separation of
church and state or the expropriation of church lands, or in the emancipation
of education from ecclesiastical authority. (Berger 1967: 107)
In line with the mainstream view in the sociology of religion at the time, Berger
(1967) still supported the thesis that modernization inevitably led to secularization.
He maintained that the secularizing effect of modernization was rendered plausible
by Max Weber’s thesis of the ‘‘disenchantment of the world,’’ a process that was
significantly fostered in the Western world by Protestantism.4 Hence, secularization
theory ‘‘stood in a long tradition of modern thought about religion’’ (Berger 2014:
18) that can be traced back via the founding fathers of sociology, Weber, Durkheim,
and Comte, to the thinkers of the Enlightenment.
Since the French Revolution, the European intellectual and cultural elite has
generally been anti-ecclesiastical. The so-called ‘‘intelligentsia,’’ which Berger and
Huntington (2002: 50) reconstructed as a ‘‘world intellectual culture,’’ is a
thoroughly secularized milieu. However, as such, it is the exception rather than the
rule. In Berger’s view, this milieu has been largely responsible for the persistence of
the secularization theory paradigm.
In the light of the resurgence of Islam and the sometimes explosive global
expansion of religious movements (especially Pentecostalism, the Pentecostal
version of Evangelical Protestantism) Berger now considers secularization theory to
be empirically untenable (Berger 2014; Berger and Zijderveld 2009). In taking this
view, he does not overlook the fact that, as a result of mass education, the
secularized attitude of the academic milieu has spread to more and more social
strata. The plausibility of religious experiences is weakened when cognitive elites
have a secularized worldview (see Wuthnow et al. 1984: 64). Empirically, however,
religiosity not only persists at a global level, it is also growing. And to interpret this
as a pre-modern or transient phenomenon—as secularization theory does—would be
milieu- or Eurocentric.
Luckmann (1967) debunked secularization as a ‘‘modern myth’’ much earlier
than Berger did. However, Berger, too, soon corrected his assumption of a
4 For Protestantism ‘‘divested itself as much as possible from the three most ancient and most powerful
concomitants of the sacred—mystery, miracle, and magic’’ (Berger 1967: 111).
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‘‘necessary interdependence’’ (Pollack 2014: 114) between modernization and
secularization (see Berger 1971a, 1971b). The only thing that is empirically tenable
is a correlation between pluralization and secularization—and only in Western
Europe. According to Berger, the mistake that the secularization theorists—and, in
particular, European intellectuals—made was that they elevated a historical
exception to the rule, and Western Europe to a global yardstick.
In Religious America—Secular Europe?, Berger et al. (2008) analyzed this
exceptional case—Western Europe. Like any other historical phenomenon,
secularization cannot be explained monocausally. Rather, there are a large number
of reasons why Western Europe became a geographical exception. They include the
tendency to attach particular importance to the relationship between church and
state, something that struck Alexis de Tocqueville in 1831, when he compared
religious observance in Europe and America: ‘‘He sought to make sense of this
strange (for him, a French European) situation of religious vitality with reference to
the separation of church and state in the United States’’ (Berger et al. 2008: 23f.).
Even in colonial America, no church ever succeeded in achieving a dominant
position that would have enabled it to develop an exclusive relationship with the
temporal power.5 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution adopted in
1791 ideologically legitimated freedom of religion and the separation of church and
state. As a consequence, churches were accorded merely the status of ‘‘voluntary
associations.’’ In Europe, by contrast, established, or state, churches persisted into
the twentieth century and, as in the case of the Church of England, sometimes still
exist. As a result, the churches have been closely identified with authority. The
strikingly large numbers of people in Western Europe who either do not belong to,
or do not attend, a church is, not least, an expression of dissatisfaction with the state.
When he first abandoned secularization theory in the late 1990s, Berger (1999)
formulated the thesis of a counter-trend—‘‘de-secularization’’ or ‘‘counter-secular-
ization.’’ Nowadays, however, he insists that the religious persists alongside the
secular. In taking this view, he by no means denies the enormous consequences of
modernization for religions, which had a monopoly position in the premodern era.
Berger (2014: 48f.) acknowledges that pluralism changes the relation between
religion and state and between clergy and laity. Moreover, ‘‘pluralism changes the
relation of religious institutions with each other.’’ Nowadays, religions find
themselves in a competitive situation that forces them to make their respective
meaning offerings appear attractive. This gives lay people the opportunity to choose
between different religious purveyors of meaning and to put together their own
eclectic packages of spiritual meaning. As a result, the religious institutions lose
their hitherto existing power to impose sanctions, and their economic power
dwindles because of decreasing membership.6
5 The attempt by the Puritans to establish Calvinism as the state church in Massachusetts failed, as did a
similar attempt on the part of the Anglicans in Virginia. This failure was due not to the postulate of
tolerance but to the opposition of competing religions.
6 Religions can respond to this competitive situation by opening up or closing themselves off. In Berger’s
view, neither isolation from the outside world nor internal closure has a lasting prospect for success. The
practical advice he gives to church institutions is to engage in ecumenical dialogue with competitors
without sacrificing the fundamental tenets of their respective religions. This presupposes prior
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However, these diverse developments are captured only roughly by the term
secularization. Hence, Berger uses the term religious pluralism to describe the
competitive situation with all its consequences. The example of the enshrining of
the separation of church and state in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, alone, shows that the process that is subsumed under secularization is
a process of differentiation that began in the ‘‘axial age’’ and—significantly fostered
by the division of labor—still continues in the modern age.7 Moreover, with regard
to the institutional structure of society, secularization is a process of religious de-
institutionalization (Berger 2014: 7).8 However, de-institutionalization is by no
means limited to religious institutions, nor can it be halted by additional
legitimation measures. For, as a result of pluralization, we are constantly confronted
with alternatives for roles, identities, interpretation schemes, values, and world-
views. These alternatives force us to reflect; they successively undermine the taken-
for-grantedness of institutions and slowly but surely erode them from within.
Relativization is the term Berger uses to denote this process.
Pluralization means Relativization
‘‘Modernity pluralizes’’ (Berger and Zijderveld 2009: 7; emphasis in the original).
Berger is still convinced of this connection between modernization and pluraliza-
tion. However, by acknowledging the existence of de-institutionalization, he
undermines the notion of linearity inherent in modernization theory (just as his
concept of de-secularization undermined the linearity inherent in secularization
theory). Modernization is by no means a linear process, nor does it produce the same
results everywhere and under all conditions.
Irrespective of the specific form that modernity takes, it has a reinforcing effect
on pluralism. Demographically, population growth and migration reinforce
pluralism because they give rise to extensive urbanization, thus causing more and
more people of different origins to live together in an increasingly confined space.
Economically, pluralism is fostered by the geographic and social mobility that
accompanies industrialization and the market economy. Like media communication,
this mobility is a constant reminder of the pluralism of lifestyles and mentalities.
And politically, the rule of law and democracy serve as institutional guarantors of
reasonably peaceful coexistence. Hence, Berger and Zijderveld defined plurality
(which Berger now calls pluralism) as ‘‘a situation in which diverse human groups
(ethnic, religious, or however differentiated) live together under conditions of civic
peace and in social interaction with each other’’ (2009: 7).
Footnote 6 continued
clarification of the intrinsic and extrinsic elements of faith: What is considered to be ultimate truth must
be defended; what is deemed to be ‘‘negotiable,’’ may be negotiated (see Berger 1992: 63).
7 This understanding of structural secularization (as part of functional differentiation) constitutes the core
of secularization theory (see Bruce 2002, 2011; Pollack 2003, 2013).




Berger calls the downside of this undoubtedly desirable modern situation the
‘‘great relativizing cauldron’’ (1979: 9). The unquestionable nature of schemes of
interpretation is relativized, as is the unassailability of value systems, and, indeed,
every worldview. The resulting interpretation problems and uncertainties of moral
evaluation are caused not by a shortage but rather by an oversupply of co-existing
patterns of interpretation and sets of values.
Berger’s trust in pluralism as a solution stems from the assumption that—
especially under urban conditions where people must inevitably have dealings with
each other—this social situation perpetuates ‘‘cognitive contamination’’ (i.e., mutual
influence in the course of everyday conversation).9 As a consequence, it also
perpetuates relativization, which ‘‘is the insight that reality can be perceived and
lived differently from what one had thought of as the only way. Or, put simply,
things can be really, really different’’ (Berger 2014: 3).
Relativity is the price to be paid for modernity. This situation, which, following
Helmut Schelsky, could be described as institutionalized permanent doubt, prompts
the kind of counter-reactions that are outlined in detail by Berger and Zijderveld: At
one extreme, all religious and secular fundamentalisms try to banish doubt once and
for all; at the other extreme, doubt is elevated to the status of relativism—a
phenomenon that the authors detect among some postmodern thinkers (Berger and
Zijderveld 2009: 57).10
A central concept in Berger’s latest work (2014) is discourse. Berger and
Zijderveld (2009) identified discourse as a key term in postmodernist theory, an
approach for which the authors displayed undisguised disdain, as it is characterized
in their view by the idea that ‘‘there is no objective truth’’ and that ‘‘all narratives are
equally valid’’ (2009: 52): ‘‘Although there are no objectively valid bodies of
knowledge, there are different ‘discourses,’ always in the service of some existing
or aspired-to power structure. Each discourse is a body of narratives’’ (2009: 55f.).
Although Berger does not explicitly state it, ‘‘secular discourse’’ as he understands it
is a package of bureaucratic, capitalist, technological, and many other narratives.
Berger concedes that secularization theory has a kernel of truth: ‘‘Modernity has
indeed produced a secular discourse, which enables people to deal with many areas
of life without reference to any religious definitions of reality’’ (Berger 2014: 51).
However, he does not allude to the discourse concept’s connotations as a
postmodernist slogan against ‘‘objectively valid bodies of knowledge’’ and their
empirical verifiability. He attaches more importance to the question of how religious
pluralism can be politically managed. In view of the sociopolitical explosiveness of
religious pluralism, he considers the social theory dimension of ‘‘pluralism in the
mind’’ to be of secondary importance
9 However, it is also conceivable that the opposite may happen—namely, that a person with an
unstable worldview may be persuaded that the worldview of his conversation partner is the right one and
may become a passionate advocate of it. The fundamentalist zeal of the convert is a well-known
phenomenon.
10 Communities, groups, associations, families, neighbors, etc. offer relative certainty between these
extremes. These social forms, which Gehlen called secondary institutions, mediate, as it were, between
the individual and society, also with regard to superordinate value configurations.
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Plurality and Hybridity
The formula cuius regio, eius religio (the ruler decides the religion), which was the
basis of the Peace of Augsburg (1555), and was reiterated in the Peace of
Westphalia (1648), was the way in which the still relatively limited degree of
religious pluralism (Catholicism and Protestantism) in the Holy Roman Empire was
politically managed under the then-prevailing conditions of religiously homoge-
neous territories. Deliberately overstraining the analogy to make a point, I would
argue that, in relation to ‘‘pluralism in the mind,’’ Berger implies a somewhat
similar ‘‘vision of peace’’ that one could sum up in the principle: ‘‘the field (of
activity) decides the relevance structure.’’
Berger acknowledges the resulting tensions and burdens for religious conscious-
ness. In his view, they can be managed only by navigating between relevance
structures and relevance hierarchies (2014: 61). However, he refuses to see anything
mysterious about the way people manage to do this: ‘‘For most religious believers,
faith and secularity are not mutually exclusive modes of attending to reality; it is not
a matter of either/or, but rather of both/and. The ability to handle different
discourses (to use Alfred Schutz’s term, difference relevance structures) is an
essential trait of a modern person’’ (2014: 53).
Using the piloting of an airplane as an example, Berger makes it clear that even a
religiously minded pilot is obliged to devote his full attention to the secular
discourse during the flight. The distinction between ‘‘in the cockpit’’ and ‘‘outside
the cockpit’’ reflects a sequential understanding of secularity and religion: ‘‘Perhaps,
as soon as our [Japanese] pilot comes home and has changed into traditional
clothing, he will sit before a little Buddhist shrine in the apartment and chant sutras
or engage in meditation’’ (Berger 2014: 72).
Berger also processually interprets the following scene that he experienced at a
Buddhist temple during a visit to Hong Kong:
In front of a large statue of the Buddha stood a middle-aged Chinese man in a
business suit, bowed in a posture of devotion. In one hand he held an incense
stick, in the other hand, a cell phone into which he was speaking. (…) This
conversation could have had to do with any number of areas of the man’s life,
and may perhaps have been in the context of some business transaction. (…)
Nevertheless, at this moment the man was simultaneously performing an act of
worship (bowing with an incense stick in hand) and engaging in a mundane
conversation. (…) While physically engaging in an act of Buddhist worship,
he was also simultaneously engaged in what is usually a secular form of
communication. He certainly seemed quite successful in managing this
synthesis. (Berger 2014: 68f.)
Religiously minded individuals do not try to find a way out of this complex situation
by simplifying it11 or by seeing it either as one thing or the other. Rather, according
to Berger (2014: 88) they adopt an attitude of ‘‘multi-relationality,’’ which Berger,
11 Berger et al. (1973: 209) identify simplification in the sense of the rejection of the dichotomy (here: of
the public and private spheres) as a way of dealing with the ‘‘frustrations of multi-relationality.’’
156 M. Pfadenhauer
123
Berger, and Kellner defined as ‘‘a tension of consciousness characterized by a quick
alertness to ever-changing constellations of phenomena’’ (1973: 37).
Although he emphasizes the simultaneity of the religious and the secular, and he
recognizes people’s ability to synthesize religion and secularity, Berger interprets
the process from the perspective of a switch logic, and—despite the speed with
which consciousness manages to switch between a religious and a secular attitude—
he thus underscores the difference between the religious and secular realms. In his
response to Berger, Pollack (2014: 120) classifies this new approach as a ‘‘a
paradigm of differentiation theory’’ in the sense of functional differentiation rather
than the problem form of unity and difference. Pollack sees in this a change of
direction (not back to the classical, but) toward the analytical core of secularization
theory. Above all, however, he also sees in the phenomenon of the pluralization of
worldviews and religion the potential for a paradigm shift: ‘‘Also important is yet
another question—What other relations between religious and secular discourse are
imaginable and likely, apart from their co-existence: mutual exclusion, conflict,
predominance of one over the other, subversion, mutual penetration, provincializa-
tion, isolation, persistence, revolutionary universalization?’’ (Pollack 2014: 115).
Like Berger, Nancy T. Ammerman, who considers herself to be on the periphery
of the secularization debate, emphasizes the importance of conversation for
religious consciousness, without conceiving of it as being reduced to the thinking of
the individual. However, she does not stress the contaminating power of
conversation but rather the consciousness-forming power of narratives, which is
therefore not a social-psychological but rather a social phenomenon: ‘‘Religious
consciousness is produced in conversation, carried by actors from one place to
another, and re-deployed and re-worked in each new telling’’ (2014: 102). Contrary
to what Berger assumes, Ammerman’s empirical research, which focuses on ‘‘the
everyday stories of a wide array of Americans’’ (2014: 101), did not reveal rapid
code switching between the secular and the sacred. Rather, her findings suggest that,
like ‘‘Spanglish’’ (a mix of Spanish and English characterized by the fact that
Spanish and English words occur in the one sentence) something unique—a hybrid
mix of the sacred and the secular—evolves during conversation.
Following this logic, and going even further than Pollack (2014), the elaboration
of the ‘‘both/and’’ (i.e., sociological reflection on the figure of the simultaneity of
the religious and the secular) has the explosive power to trigger a paradigm shift. A
fundamental prerequisite for a paradigm shift is the existence of another paradigm
that distinguishes between the religious and the secular. Everything hybrid is
socially constructed, and the assumption of hybridity must always be preceded by a
delineation from something that is non-hybrid and unequivocal. Paradoxically, a
‘‘both/and’’ logic methodologically presupposes ‘‘both the both/and and the either/
or’’ (Kron and Berger 2015: 7).
The socially constructed nature of social hybridity is reflected in its designation
as something that overcomes the boundaries between things that were previously
separated (Bullik and Schroer 2015: 215).12 With regard to religion, Peter L. Berger
12 The prime example is the body, which was determined for a long time by the nature-culture or
naturalness–artificiality dichotomy. On man as a hybrid or a cyborg, see Haraway (1991).
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played a significant role in bringing about such a separation: Secularization theory,
the core of which is the thesis that ‘‘modernity necessarily brings about a decline of
religion’’ (2014: ix), not only cements the ‘‘either/or’’ nature of the religious and the
secular but also manifests a classical sociological perspective. To be able, now, to
conceive of the religious and the secular as simultaneous, one needs this typically
modern distinction between religious and secular in order to be able to go beyond
it.13
Another way of conceiving of the religious and the secular as simultaneous (and
one that would probably appeal more to Berger) is via Hannah Arendt’s concept of
plurality. Berger and Zijderveld considered the basic fact in their definition of
plurality to be ‘‘the diversity in the groups making up a society’’ (2009: 8). In their
view, plurality exists only if these groups do not engage in violent conflict but
rather—despite their diversity—‘‘live together under conditions of civil peace and
in social interaction’’ (2009: 7). Hannah Arendt (1998 [1958)]) locates plurality on
an even more basic level—not at the level of the group but rather in the conditio
humana.14 It is the execution of multiperspectivity in the sense of a diversity of
irreducible perspectives on a common world; and it is a structural condition of being
human that can be identified only through its phenomenal execution in the world.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
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